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Abstract
After exchanges and alternative trading venues have introduced electronic execution mechanisms
worldwide, the focus of the securities trading industry shifted to the use of fully electronic trading
engines by banks, brokers and their institutional customers. These Algorithmic Trading engines enable
order submissions without human intervention based on quantitative models applying historical and
real-time market data. Although there is a widespread discussion on the pros and cons of Algorithmic
Trading and on its impact on market volatility and market quality, little is known on how algorithms
actually place their orders in the market and whether and in which respect this differs form other
order submissions. Based on a dataset that – for the first time – includes a specific flag to enable the
identification of orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading engines, the paper investigates the extent of
Algorithmic Trading activity and specifically their order placement strategies in comparison to human
traders in the Xetra trading system. It is shown that Algorithmic Trading has become a relevant part
of overall market activity and that Algorithmic Trading engines fundamentally differ from human
traders in their order submission, modification and deletion behavior as they exploit real-time market
data and latest market movements.
Keywords: Electronic Markets, Algorithmic Trading, Order Submission, Securities Trading.
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INTRODUCTION

IT has triggered a significant transformation in securities trading: The electronification of market
venues in Europe, i.e. exchange trading systems like Xetra (Deutsche Börse), SETS (London Stock
Exchange) or NSC (Euronext Paris) took place in the late 1990s and enabled market participants
(banks, brokers as well as their institutional and retail customers) to access electronic order books via
remote access without the need for physical presence on an exchange floor. Now, a second electronic
revolution in securities trading is taking place (Preuss 2007): market participants along the value chain
started an arms race by automating their trading processes, specifically by applying Algorithmic
Trading. Definitions of Algorithmic Trading conceptualize it as the general “use of computer
algorithms to manage the trading process” (Hendershott et al. 2008, p.1) or as the “computerized
execution of financial instruments following pre-specified rules and guidelines” (Kissell & Malamut
2006, p.12). Gomber & Gsell (2006, p.541) define it as a technology that “emulates a broker’s core
competence of slicing a big order into a multiplicity of smaller orders and of timing these orders to
minimize market impact via electronic means”. These algorithms determine ex ante or continuously
the optimum volume of the (next) order slice and its time of submission to the market based on
mathematical models and considering historical and real-time market data.
For Algorithmic Trading engines, speed of execution, availability of real-time market data and
minimum latency have become key success factors as already milliseconds can make a difference. As
the speed of data communication is limited by the speed of light, the best option for minimizing
latency is to get physically closer to the market. Market operators therefore offer co-location services
where market participants can place their trading servers adjacent to the technical infrastructure of the
market itself and thus ensure low latency (a latency measurement methodology has been proposed by
Budimir & Schweickert (2007)). The downside of this development for market operators is that they
have to cope with increasing demands for speed and growing amounts of data and message traffic, i.e.
higher investments to upgrade their infrastructure especially for peak loads. The load on market
operators’ systems is steadily increasing as “Algorithmic Trading is the fastest growing source of
order flow” (Preuss 2007, p.154). However, there is only little academic work on how Algorithmic
Trading engines schedule their trading strategies and adapt their behavior to current market
movements and whether or to which extent it is different to the trading behavior of (human) traders.
Based on a unique dataset that encompasses all order book activity in the 30 most liquid shares traded
on Xetra, the electronic trading system of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, this research aims at
demonstrating the manifest differences in the order submission and deletion behavior of Algorithmic
Trading engines versus other order flow submitters. This is facilitated as the dataset enables to
distinguish between orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading systems and orders submitted by
humans. In particular, differences in the order submission strategies and order aggressiveness as well
as concerning update/deletion strategies are disclosed. In the following section 2, related work on
Algorithmic Trading is discussed. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the application domain,
describes the available dataset as well as the applied methodology. Section 4 presents the results
obtained while the final section concludes and gives an outlook on future research in this field.

2

RELATED WORK

Algorithmic Trading systems typically aim at achieving or beating a specified benchmark with their
executions and may be distinguished by their underlying benchmark, their aggressiveness or trading
style as well as their adaptation behavior (Kissell & Malamut 2006). The volume-weighted average
price (VWAP), which is calculated as the ratio of the value traded and the volume traded within a
specified time horizon, commonly serves as a benchmark for (automated) trading (Domowitz &
Yegerman 2005). The universe of possible strategies has been narrowed down to the efficient frontier
of optimal trading strategies (Almgren & Chriss 2000, Almgren & Lorenz 2007). There is evidence

that strategies that are adaptive to market developments, i.e. that can vary their aggressiveness, are
superior to static strategies (Almgren & Chriss 2000). Furthermore, Algorithmic Trading systems must
avoid to be detected as this leaked information could be exploited by other market participants
(Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2005). Research on aggressiveness of orders in general is given by
Ranaldo (2004) who investigated how (human) traders adapt their behavior to changes in the order
book. Empirical research found the execution quality of algorithms to be inferior to executions
handled by a broker. Nevertheless, this underperformance can be overcompensated by the fact that
algorithms are offered at lower fees than human order handling (Domowitz & Yegerman 2005), as no
(expensive) human traders are involved. Due to the increased cost consciousness among market
participants, algorithms have become an attractive alternative.
Little research is available that deals with the behavior of Algorithmic Trading systems and their
impact on the market itself. Hendershot et al. (2008) showed that Algorithmic Trading has a positive
impact on liquidity, while Gsell (2008) found evidence that it has potential to lower market volatility.
Datasets similar to the one used for the research at hand have been analyzed by Prix et al. (2007) and
(2008). The former analyzes the lifetime distribution of cancelled orders and finds systematic patterns,
while the latter investigates cancellation and re-insertion structures in the Xetra order flow. The main
distinction to those datasets and the novelty of the dataset used for this research is the information
whether an order event was submitted by an Algorithmic Trading system or a human trader.

3

APPLICATION DOMAIN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1

Xetra – The electronic trading system of Deutsche Börse AG

The Frankfurt Stock Exchange, operated by Deutsche Börse AG, has launched the fully-electronic
exchange trading system Xetra in 1997. It offers a range of market models that address different asset
classes as well as securities with differing liquidity. For high-liquid shares Xetra offers the market
model continuous trading. Continuous trading starts after an opening call auction and can be
interrupted by one or several intraday call auctions. The trading day ends with a closing call auction.
For securities in the DAX index that constitutes the dataset of this research the timing is as follows: At
08:50 the call phase of the opening auction starts. In the call phase, the order book is partially open, as
only the indicative auction price and volume (the volume and price at which would be executed if the
call phase would end instantaneously) or best bid and offer and their volumes are disseminated.
Instantly after the end of the call phase, the auction price is determined according to the principle of
most executable volume (Schwartz & Francioni 2004). All auction call phases feature a predefined
length plus a random end of at most 30 seconds. This means, that for all DAX securities the price of
the opening auction is determined between 09:00:00 and 09:00:30. After the opening auction,
continuous trading starts and for each order immediately upon entry it is checked whether the new
order is executable against orders on the other side of the order book. If no execution is possible or
the order was not completely executed, the order is stored in the order book according to price-time
priority. During continuous trading the order book is open, i.e. the limits, the accumulated volume per
limit and the number of orders per limit are displayed. An intraday call auction interrupts continuous
trading at 13:00. After the auction, continuous trading resumes until it is ended by the closing auction
which starts at 17:30. To ensure price continuity, continuous trading may be contingently interrupted
by volatility interruptions. In case the next potential price lies outside pre-defined price ranges, a
volatility interruption stops continuous trading for an additional unscheduled call auction.
To submit their trading intentions, market participants use market or limit orders. Market orders are
unlimited buy or sell orders, which are to be executed at the next price determined. Limit orders are
buy or sell orders, which are to be executed at their specified limit or better. The buy limit order with
the highest limit and the sell limit order with the lowest limit in the order book define the spread of the
market. A buy (sell) limit order that is immediately executable due to a limit equal to or higher (lower)
than the current best offer (bid) is also called “marketable limit order” as its result equals the result of

a market order, i.e. immediate execution. Therefore, market orders and limit orders that trigger
immediate executions are called aggressive (or submitted by an aggressor), whilst limit orders that are
not immediately executable and that are positioned in the order book are called non-aggressive (or
submitted by a non-aggressor). An iceberg order is a hidden order type specified by a limit, an overall
volume and a peak volume. The peak is the visible part of an iceberg and is introduced into the order
book according to price-time priority. In continuous trading, as soon as the peak has been completely
executed and hidden volume is still available, a new peak is entered into the book. For further
information on order types and the market model for equity trading see Deutsche Börse AG (2008a).
3.2

The available dataset

The blue-chip index DAX comprises the 30 largest and most actively traded companies that are listed
at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. For these securities in 2007, 98% of the order book turnover on
German exchanges was executed on the Xetra trading system (Deutsche Börse AG 2007). The dataset
provided by Deutsche Börse AG encompasses all Xetra order book events for the DAX securities
within the week from October 8th to 12th, 2007, comprising of 9,036,638 events in total and 593,857
trades with an overall value of € 33,019,307,823.56 in continuous trading and call auctions. For each
single order book event a code is given that specifies the type of event that occurred. 46.6% of the
events are order insertions, 0.9% are modifications, 34.6% are deletions. The number of modifications
is rather low because in the Xetra trading system only a reduction of the order’s volume leads to a
modification event retaining the time-stamp, as it does not affect price-time priority. All other changes
to order parameters are mapped to a deletion event and a subsequent submission event of a ‘new’ (the
modified) order applying a new timestamp. 11% of the events are full executions and 5.9% represent
partial executions. The remaining 1% consist of other primarily technical events that are not relevant
for the analysis. Each event is assigned a timestamp, identifiers for the affected securities and orders,
characteristics of the order and event-specific fields, e.g. a price for an execution. The given
timestamps have a precision of 1/100 second.
What makes the available dataset unique is an additional flag in the data that indicates whether the
submitter of the order event has been an algorithm. As an order can only be modified by the submitter,
all events corresponding to the same order will have the same flag, i.e. an order is either an
Algorithmic Trading order or not. Deutsche Börse AG offers a special pricing model, the so-called
Automated Trading Program (ATP), which charges a lower fee for automated trading. The exchange
defines ATP transactions as “all transactions that have been generated by an electronic system of
either the ATP member or the ATP member’s clients, whereby the electronic system has to determine
two out of the three following order parameters: price (order type and/or order limit where applicable),
timing (time of order entry) and quantity (quantity of the order in number of securities)” (Deutsche
Börse AG 2008b, p.1). In this program, depending on the accumulated monthly ATP volume per ATP
member, a marginal rebate of up to 60% of trading fees applies. To qualify for fee rebates offered by
ATP, a member’s trading process has to fulfill some prerequisites. The thereby generated orders have
to be channeled directly into the Xetra system without further manual intervention. To enable the
application of lower trading fees the ATP orders furthermore must be submitted using a designated
ATP Trader-ID. All order events that were submitted using such an ATP Trader-ID are tagged in the
available data set. As the tag is anonymous it just gives the information whether this order event is an
ATP event or not. It is not possible to pin down behavior to a specific ATP Trader-ID or to directly
determine whether two different orders have been submitted by the same market participant or not.
The requirements set by Deutsche Börse to qualify for ATP shall ensure that the users are machines,
i.e. Algorithmic Traders. However, it cannot be ensured that vice versa all machines make actually use
of the ATP fee rebate, i.e. an event not flagged as an ATP event (in the following: Non-ATP) may still
have been submitted by an algorithm. Though, given that the fee rebates of ATP constitute a strong
truth-telling incentive for market participants, one can assume the accuracy of the ATP flag to be high.

3.3

Methodology

Based on the succession of order events in the dataset, the state of each instrument’s order book has
been reconstructed event-by-event for each single point of time in the observation period according to
the matching rules effective on Xetra. The executions determined based on this order book
reconstruction have been validated against the actual executions reported in the dataset to ensure the
reconstruction’s accuracy. The reconstruction enables to investigate order events relative to the current
order book situation, i.e. in continuous trading submissions or deletions of orders may be assessed in
the context of the best bid and offer limits (the spread) prevailing at the time of the event.
Chi-square tests are applied to test whether the obtained results are stochastically dependent on the
ATP and Non-ATP classification, i.e. whether there are significant differences in the unveiled
behaviour.
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RESULTS – STRATEGIES OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING
ENGINES VERSUS HUMAN TRADERS

The analysis targets at comparing the trading strategies of Algorithmic Trading engines and human
traders in several dimensions and to answer the following research questions in this context:
1. What is the overall extent of Algorithmic Trading activity relative to human traders’ activity?
2. Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading
engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market movements and
market information when algorithms execute orders aggressively?
3. Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading
engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market movements and
market information when algorithms position non-aggressive orders in the order book?
The focus for the analysis of the research questions is laid on the continuous trading phases as auctions
with their call phases of up to ten minutes without any executions exhibit a different trading behavior.
The volumes executed in auctions would distort the time-series analysis as they concentrate large
execution volumes at a single point of time. Within the dataset 13.4% of overall executed shares
(volume) are executed in call auctions, representing 14.0% of the total traded value (in €). These
figures include call auctions triggered by volatility interruptions. Within the observation period, five
volatility interruptions occurred in different securities executing a total of 46,068 shares representing
less than 0.01% of the overall value traded. The analysis of Algorithmic Trading behavior in auctions
will be subject to future research. Therefore, the results presented here refer to continuous trading that
represents 97% of the overall trading time.
Research question 1: What is the overall extent of Algorithmic Trading activity relative to human
traders’ activity?
The activity of ATP traders can be analyzed from two perspectives. On the one hand there is the sheer
amount of events (traffic on the electronic trading system) that can be analyzed comparing ATP and
Non-ATP events. On the other hand, the focus may be laid on the actual executions by algorithms, i.e.
the trading activity, rather than on the mere technical events. Table 1 summarizes the events (see the
first two columns for ATP and Non-ATP) and actual executions (see columns 3 to 6 for ATP and NonATP) occurring during continuous trading per security. It shows that Algorithmic Trading constitutes a
relevant part of overall system traffic and also of actual trading activity. In the observation period, the
overall share of ATP events is 52.3% and for only five out of the 30 securities the share of ATP events
is below 50%. Fresenius Medical Care with 69.0% has the highest rate of ATP events while
Volkswagen has the lowest rate (35.8%). Concerning the actual execution events, i.e. partial or
complete executions, ATP has a share of 54.7% whereby Linde has the highest rate of ATP execution
events with 65.0% while Deutsche Telekom has the lowest with 42.9%.

Adidas
Allianz
BASF
Bayer
BMW
Commerzbank
Continental
Daimler
Deutsche Bank
Deutsche Börse
Deutsche Post
Deutsche Postbank
Deutsche Telekom
E.ON
Fresenius Med. Care
Henkel
Hypo Real Estate
Infineon
Linde
Lufthansa
MAN
Merck
Metro
Münchner Rück
RWE
SAP
Siemens
ThyssenKrupp
TUI
Volkswagen
Total

Instrument
52.6%
52.3%
59.3%
57.5%
50.7%
46.1%
58.5%
50.1%
53.4%
49.1%
52.2%
51.6%
51.6%
56.1%
69.0%
52.0%
50.4%
60.0%
62.6%
65.7%
51.2%
66.8%
51.7%
48.1%
41.5%
51.4%
55.4%
64.2%
52.0%
35.8%
52.3%

Share

Table 1.

91,795
292,196
172,465
172,201
106,861
126,099
114,421
258,604
267,273
133,699
102,557
59,799
113,233
265,464
107,384
76,442
123,036
98,330
134,642
135,855
172,761
78,830
77,147
212,972
155,455
243,279
278,179
158,403
65,474
229,196
4,624,052

Events
308,233,612
1,455,589,385
889,758,389
989,237,021
444,371,422
742,364,567
401,969,476
2,151,416,279
1,594,711,428
960,562,420
581,767,692
168,314,037
1,012,429,825
1,529,680,829
158,454,475
185,661,502
361,043,311
469,101,313
333,153,037
384,794,459
619,494,708
307,386,567
221,789,717
881,141,537
997,175,684
2,049,684,431
1,786,939,922
442,257,844
180,619,398
1,779,973,952
24,389,078,240

Value (€)
41.9%
48.9%
50.4%
42.8%
43.5%
32.9%
39.2%
46.0%
42.4%
43.2%
33.8%
41.6%
33.2%
56.0%
53.0%
35.8%
41.5%
40.5%
55.6%
51.5%
38.1%
43.9%
40.6%
50.9%
48.5%
37.9%
50.4%
46.9%
36.4%
36.5%
43.0%

Share
82,882
265,999
118,232
127,413
103,943
147,673
81,009
258,018
233,233
138,387
93,961
56,156
106,378
207,421
48,137
70,543
120,956
65,612
80,345
71,015
164,805
39,156
72,191
230,222
218,999
230,183
224,035
88,513
60,343
411,168
4,216,928

Events
47.4%
47.7%
40.7%
42.5%
49.3%
53.9%
41.5%
49.9%
46.6%
50.9%
47.8%
48.4%
48.4%
43.9%
31.0%
48.0%
49.6%
40.0%
37.4%
34.3%
48.8%
33.2%
48.3%
51.9%
58.5%
48.6%
44.6%
35.8%
48.0%
64.2%
47.7%

Share

ATP and Non-ATP activity during continuous trading

ATP
Execution
Share
Events
15,899 54.6%
43,208 59.6%
30,156 62.2%
37,073 56.4%
19,722 53.4%
27,922 45.9%
18,541 51.8%
52,263 55.8%
41,985 52.5%
31,833 55.5%
18,433 45.6%
10,870 53.6%
19,752 42.9%
40,173 62.4%
12,486 58.5%
12,235 46.4%
19,458 51.5%
16,354 50.5%
18,179 65.0%
20,766 61.6%
25,917 52.6%
15,212 57.8%
11,448 54.0%
31,270 62.3%
30,675 58.6%
57,515 48.3%
43,853 58.9%
25,090 62.2%
10,934 50.2%
54,846 53.1%
814,068 54.7%

Non-ATP
Execution
Share
Events
13,197 45.4%
29282 40.4%
18,336 37.8%
28,698 43.6%
17,181 46.6%
32,967 54.1%
17,267 48.2%
41,427 44.2%
37,945 47.5%
25,529 44.5%
21,997 54.4%
9,420 46.4%
26,316 57.1%
24,179 37.6%
8,846 41.5%
14,119 53.6%
18,359 48.5%
16,014 49.5%
9,807 35.0%
12,933 38.4%
23,362 47.4%
11,109 42.2%
9,755 46.0%
18889 37.7%
21,650 41.4%
61,624 51.7%
30,554 41.1%
15,228 37.8%
10849 49.8%
48,460 46.9%
675,299 45.3%
427,333,950
1,520,815,223
874,243,332
1,322,869,917
576,016,375
1,516,002,668
624,238,212
2,525,344,806
2,164,330,852
1,262,130,542
1,141,429,062
236,203,732
2,032,482,945
1,201,021,115
140,433,106
332,312,755
508,504,512
687,986,171
265,955,747
361,770,805
1,006,148,736
393,078,246
324,935,561
848,785,177
1,060,193,847
3,354,701,075
1,757,568,726
500,784,030
316,040,687
3,092,226,374
32,375,888,285

Value (€)

58.1%
51.1%
49.6%
57.2%
56.5%
67.1%
60.8%
54.0%
57.6%
56.8%
66.2%
58.4%
66.8%
44.0%
47.0%
64.2%
58.5%
59.5%
44.4%
48.5%
61.9%
56.1%
59.4%
49.1%
51.5%
62.1%
49.6%
53.1%
63.6%
63.5%
57.0%

Share

The value associated with ATP trading is 43.0% on average for all securities. As execution events are
considered in Table 1, the traded value is double-counted; once for the buyer and once for the seller.
52.7% of the orders entered during continuous trading are ATP orders. ATP and Non-ATP submission
exhibit a similar share of aggressive orders (ATP: 14.6%; Non-ATP: 11.2%) (order data not shown
additionally in Table 1 to assure readability).
In the following a deeper analysis distinguishing aggressor and non-aggressor orders is performed: If
aggressive executions are considered (Table 2), in total 56% of all executions are triggered by an ATP
order as the aggressor. Linde has the highest share of ATP aggressor executions as for 68.4% an ATP
trader was the aggressor. Further E.ON catches attention, as about two out of three executions were
triggered by ATP orders, which sum up to 63.6% of the total value traded. For Deutsche Post only
30.5% of the executed value has been triggered by aggressive ATP orders. Please note that for the
execution perspective of aggressors, the traded value is only single-counted.
Instrument
Adidas
Allianz
BASF
Bayer
BMW
Commerzbank
Continental
Daimler
Deutsche Bank
Deutsche Börse
Deutsche Post
Deutsche Postbank
Deutsche Telekom
E.ON
Fresenius Med. Care
Henkel
Hypo Real Estate
Infineon
Linde
Lufthansa
MAN
Merck
Metro
Münchner Rück
RWE
SAP
Siemens
ThyssenKrupp
TUI
Volkswagen
Total

Table 2.

#Exec.
5,871
17,939
12,284
14,661
7,759
10,674
7,428
22,544
17,440
13,079
6,329
4,343
8,217
17,075
4,930
4,603
7,587
6,232
7,916
8,285
10,385
6,132
4,890
13,263
13,280
23,196
18,266
9,446
4,101
24,282
332,437

ATP Aggressor
Share
Value (€)
51.8%
147,791,055
58.3%
815,987,786
63.6%
484,998,224
59.1%
527,610,264
54.4%
238,824,021
47.3%
378,746,474
50.9%
203,595,304
58.5% 1,175,637,024
54.1%
928,031,645
55.1%
469,242,732
45.1%
262,488,497
54.5%
91,187,404
47.7%
520,195,714
66.0%
869,026,123
57.1%
79,234,895
44.7%
95,731,876
50.5%
172,799,277
53.1%
230,433,723
68.4%
179,502,819
65.6%
207,183,994
50.6%
321,422,666
58.0%
153,860,845
57.5%
121,958,633
64.5%
497,015,484
63.4%
567,627,358
50.3% 1,116,123,006
59.3% 1,002,433,643
59.7%
227,948,418
48.9%
92,605,221
55.1%
933,547,154
56.0% 13,112,791,280

Share
40.2%
54.8%
55.0%
45.6%
46.8%
33.5%
39.7%
50.3%
49.4%
42.2%
30.5%
45.1%
34.2%
63.6%
53.0%
37.0%
39.7%
39.8%
59.9%
55.5%
39.5%
43.9%
44.6%
57.5%
55.2%
41.3%
56.6%
48.3%
37.3%
38.3%
46.2%

#Exec.
5,463
12,850
7,020
10,158
6,509
11,890
7,164
15,974
14,777
10,663
7,707
3,622
9,007
8,792
3,704
5,688
7,438
5,512
3,651
4,337
10,159
4,448
3,613
7,313
7,671
22,879
12,516
6,368
4,285
19,787
260,965

Non-ATP Aggressor
Share
Value (€)
48.2%
219,992,725
41.7%
672,214,518
36.4%
397,002,637
40.9%
628,443,205
45.6%
271,369,878
52.7%
750,437,143
49.1%
309,508,540
41.5%
1,162,743,518
45.9%
951,489,495
44.9%
642,103,749
54.9%
599,109,880
45.5%
111,071,481
52.3%
1,002,260,671
34.0%
496,324,849
42.9%
70,208,895
55.3%
163,255,253
49.5%
261,974,634
46.9%
348,110,019
31.6%
120,051,573
34.4%
166,098,638
49.4%
491,399,056
42.0%
196,371,561
42.5%
151,404,006
35.5%
367,947,874
36.6%
461,057,408
49.7%
1,586,069,746
40.7%
769,820,681
40.3%
243,572,520
51.1%
155,724,822
44.9%
1,502,553,009
44.0% 15,269,691,983

Share
59.8%
45.2%
45.0%
54.4%
53.2%
66.5%
60.3%
49.7%
50.6%
57.8%
69.5%
54.9%
65.8%
36.4%
47.0%
63.0%
60.3%
60.2%
40.1%
44.5%
60.5%
56.1%
55.4%
42.5%
44.8%
58.7%
43.4%
51.7%
62.7%
61.7%
53.8%

Number of executions and executed value for ATP- and Non-ATP aggressors in
continuous trading

Table 2 further discloses that though across all securities 56.0% of all executions are triggered by
aggressive ATP orders, they represent only 46.2% of the totally traded value. The average value per

executed order for ATP aggressor executions is 39,444 € and the average value per executed order for
Non-ATP aggressor executions is 58,512 €. There are two possible explanations:
1) ATP users have more partial executions
A possible explanation for the fact that more executions result in less executed volume would be
that aggressive Algorithmic Trading orders have more partial executions boosting their total
number of executions. If the algorithms submit orders that hit orders at several price levels, this
would result in several executions and the value per execution would be lowered.
However, this argument does not hold true. This can be checked by measuring the number of
different timestamps for the respective executions as multiple executions at the same timestamp
represent partial executions. As there are 332,437 ATP aggressor executions at only 278,374
different timestamps, 19.4% of the aggressor orders seem to cause executions at several price
levels. But for the Non-ATP aggressors there are 260,965 executions at 209,919 distinct
timestamps indicating that 24.3% of Non-ATP aggressor orders cause more than one execution.
2) Algorithms submit more but smaller orders
Assuming that the algorithms can monitor changes in the order book and react in real-time and
given that they still get what they saw when their order is arriving at the market, algorithms look
for advantageous limits in the order book and snap at the chance and execute the best bid or
offer. As the top of the book most often is thin – as the most volume is just behind the best bid
and offer – this results in more but smaller executions. Furthermore the smaller executions lead
to less market impact than larger executions that would potentially hit more than one price level.
For non-aggressor orders, Table 3 presents evidence that ATP non-aggressor orders (i.e. limit orders
that are not immediately executable) are also smaller than their Non-ATP counterparts as it depicts the
average order volumes and average order values (order volume times order limit). The surplus of NonATP orders’ average value over ATP orders’ average value is 143.5% for all securities. The values for
the individual instruments range from 40.6% (Linde) to 455.7% (Volkswagen). Please note that iceberg
orders and their peaks have not been considered for the calculation of the averages.

Adidas
Allianz
BASF
Bayer
BMW
Commerzbank
Continental
Daimler
Deutsche Bank
Deutsche Börse
Deutsche Post
Deutsche Postbank
Deutsche Telekom
E.ON
Fresenius Med. Care
Henkel
Hypo Real Estate
Infineon
Linde
Lufthansa
MAN

ATP Non-Aggressor Orders
Avg.
Avg.
#
Share Volume Value (€)
37,007 53.9%
566
25,011
119,618 51.2%
291
47,484
68,921 59.3%
468
44,842
65,683 59.4%
643
36,201
41,761 51.5%
568
26,929
47,947 48.1%
934
28,649
46,749 62.9%
241
23,903
48,249 48.1%
321
34,043
108,964 54.1%
488
45,729
97,228 48.6%
803
59,373
23,812 60.2%
379
20,553
41,370 56.3%
1,392
29,818
43,692 54.8%
3,652
50,061
108,008 54.7%
424
54,359
45,735 71.1%
527
19,137
31,483 55.5%
431
15,296
50,448 56.7%
450
19,920
40,143 66.5%
2,523
27,996
55,312 68.2%
1,186
25,134
56,682 62.7%
302
27,133
71,643 52.0%
240
28,685

Non-ATP Non-Aggressor Orders
Avg.
Avg.
Avg.
Value
#
Share Volume Value (€) Surplus
31,711 46.1%
1,104
48,854
95.3%
114,208 48.8%
566
92,271
94.3%
47,308 40.7%
754
72,447
61.6%
44,877 40.6%
1,120
62,886
73.7%
39,335 48.5%
1,087
51,566
91.5%
51,665 51.9%
1,532
47,062
64.3%
27,564 37.1%
620
61,458 157.1%
52,152 51.9%
746
79,158 132.5%
92,584 45.9%
791
74,311
62.5%
102,636 51.4%
1,221
90,798
52.9%
15,714 39.8%
803
45,553 121.6%
32,094 43.7%
2,271
50,189
68.3%
36,075 45.2%
6,247
85,648
71.1%
89,328 45.3%
733
93,872
72.7%
18,566 28.9%
1,208
43,908 129.4%
25,269 44.5%
793
28,052
83.4%
38,451 43.3%
928
40,962 105.6%
20,232 33.5%
3,681
40,836
45.9%
25,801 31.8%
1,665
35,329
40.6%
33,679 37.3%
743
66,842 146.3%
66,079 48.0%
778
92,974 224.1%

Merck
Metro
Münchner Rück
RWE
SAP
Siemens
ThyssenKrupp
TUI
Volkswagen

31,709
30,851
87,952
59,150
88,309
112,847
64,648
26,850
80,832

Total

Table 3.

51.6%
72.5%
46.2%
38.3%
53.9%
55.3%
66.3%
56.3%
31.7%

500
293
242
473
943
544
519
924
265

31,063
26,189
33,263
42,123
37,333
53,282
23,253
18,627
47,027

29,797
11,719
102,499
95,325
75,524
91,121
32,912
20,839
174,075

48.4%
27.5%
53.8%
61.7%
46.1%
44.7%
33.7%
43.7%
68.3%

1,015
444
630
789
1,452
869
900
1,931
1,480

63,028
39,497
86,497
70,133
57,548
85,074
40,428
38,896
261,346

102.9%
50.8%
160.0%
66.5%
54.1%
59.7%
73.9%
108.8%
455.7%

1,833,603 52.8%

648

37,447 1,639,139 47.2%

1,160

91,192

143.5%

Average volumes and values of submitted non-aggressor orders in continuous trading

Concerning research question 1, the data reveals that Algorithmic Trading is a relevant part of
technical events, actual executions as well as order submissions. Algorithms tend to use smaller order
volumes both for aggressive as well as for non-aggressive orders than (human) Non-ATP counterparts.
Research question 2: Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by
Algorithmic Trading engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market
movements and market information when algorithms execute orders aggressively?
Research question 2 relates to the (aggressive) execution behavior of algorithms and is addressed in
two dimensions: 2a) concerning the usage of order types by algorithms versus human traders and 2b)
concerning the submitted limits in case of aggressive limit orders by algorithms versus human traders.
2a) If ATP traders would be more aggressive one might assume that they will utilize market orders to
a larger extent than Non-ATP traders. As Table 4 points out, this is not the case, as although there is a
similar number of ATP and Non-ATP orders involved in continuous trading, only 6.2% of the market
orders have been submitted by ATP users. A straight forward chi-square test shows that the nullhypothesis of equal likelihood for ATP and Non-ATP participants to either utilize limited orders (limit
and iceberg orders) or market orders can be rejected at a p-value of 0.01, which reveals a highly
significant difference. The vast majority of ATP submitted orders are limit orders, as an aggressive
strategy can be implemented with limit orders and a smart setting of the limits as well. Such a strategy
is eased by speed and low latency to monitor market movements in real-time and to react with
minimum delay – a prerequisite that can be matched by machines.
Ordertype
Limit
Market
Iceberg
Market-To-Limit
Total

Table 4.

ATP
Occurrences
Share
2,145,968
53.9%
3,042
6.2%
4,739
8.0%
0
0.0%
2,153,749
52.7%

Non-ATP
Occurrences
Share
1,832,175
46.1%
46,352
93.8%
54,137
92.0%
587 100.0%
1,933,251
47.3%

Utilization of order types by ATP and Non-ATP traders in continuous trading

2b) In the following the focus is laid on how algorithms set order limits in relation to the prevailing
order book situation when implementing an aggressive strategy. Although ATP and Non-ATP exhibit
a similar share of aggressive orders (ATP: 14.6%, Non-ATP: 11.2%; see research question 1), the
applied limits relative to current best bids and offers differ clearly (Table 5). 67.8% of all order
submissions that exactly match the best bid or offer are ATP orders. Nearly two thirds of the other
aggressive submissions are Non-ATP orders. For ATP orders, even 85.1% of the aggressive orders are
limited exactly to the best available limit in the order book. A chi-square test shows that the nullhypothesis of equal likelihood of ATP and Non-ATP orders to submit exact limit matches can be
rejected at a p-value of 0.01, i.e. reveals a highly significant difference.

Exact Limit Matches
Other Matches

ATP
Non-ATP
Occurrences Share Occurrences Share
270,132 67.8%
128,229 32.2%
47,219 34.8%
88,531 65.2%

Total Matches

Table 5.

317,351

59.4%

216,760

40.6%

Distribution of exact limit matches

Further, 17.7% of aggressive ATP orders are also exactly matching the volume available at the best
limit (Non-ATP: 7.9%). Out of all submissions that exactly match the opposite side’s limit and volume
76.7% are ATP orders. For high-liquid securities, such as Siemens or E.ON, this proportion is even
higher (92.1% respectively 91.9%). Referring to research question 2, these results indicate that ATP
orders’ limits and volumes are based on a real-time monitoring of the market and are set based on
latest market movements.
Research question 3: Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by
Algorithmic Trading engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market
movements and market information when algorithms position non-aggressive orders in the order
book?
Research question 3 relates to the (non-aggressive) submission behavior and can be addressed in two
dimensions: 3a) concerning the positioning of non-aggressive orders by algorithms versus human
traders relative to the current best bids or best offers and 3b) concerning the adaptation of limits by
algorithms versus human traders in case of changing best bids or best offers.
3a) Table 6 points out the different positioning of non-aggressive ATP and Non-ATP orders. Of the
non-aggressive orders that improve the spread, 75.9% are ATP orders, while of the orders that do not
affect the spread 62.5% are Non-ATP. A chi-square test (null-hypothesis: equal likelihood of ATP and
Non-ATP orders to improve the spread) can be rejected at a p-value of 0.01, i.e. again reveals a highly
significant difference among ATP and Non-ATP orders. The different order positioning behavior can
also be seen from the weighted-average absolute variation in cents by which orders narrow the spread.
ATP orders improve the best limit on average by 1.38 cents while Non-ATP orders improve it by 1.95
cents, i.e. algorithms are able to position orders at the top of the book with a lower concession in terms
of price improvement.

Spread Improvement
No Spread Improvement
Total

Table 6.

ATP
Non-ATP
Occurrences Share Occurrences Share
1,007,781 75.9%
320,496 24.1%
830,350 37.5%
1,385,458 62.5%
1,838,131

51.9%

1,705,954

48.1%

Distribution of spread improvements

3b) As shown above, ATP market participants limit the majority of their non-aggressive order in a
way to be at the spread by either adding volume to the existing spread limit or setting a better limit. As
these orders are positioned at the top of the book, i.e. they have a high likelihood of execution, it is of
interest to investigate their further lifetime. The following table 7 depicts what happens to orders that
are part of the spread when their lifetime ends. The absolute figures reveal that there are by far more
ATP orders that end their lifetime being at the spread. As for table 7 the distribution of the termination
reasons is in the focus, the percentages are calculated in relation to all termination reasons at the
spread for each ATP and Non-ATP. About two thirds of Non-ATP orders end their lifetime at the
spread by getting executed, while about one third gets deleted. For ATP orders these ratios are nearly
vice versa. 63.2% of the ATP orders that end their lifetime being part of the spread are deleted. Again,

a chi-square test (null-hypothesis: equal likelihood of ATP and Non-ATP orders to be terminated by
execution; p-value of 0.01) reveals a highly significant difference between ATP and Non-ATP orders.
The third and sixth column (table 7) list the average time in milliseconds, that the orders were
continuously part of the spread before termination. The average survival times for orders terminated
by execution are similar. This meets the expectation, as for executions the survival time is determined
by other (aggressive) orders and therefore can not be influenced by the order positioned at the spread.
However, for deleted Non-ATP orders the survival time is nearly twice the one for deleted ATP
orders. 63.2% of ATP orders are deleted on average 6.519 seconds after becoming part of the spread.
At a first glance it seems as if ATP users initially submit orders at the spread and then get cold feet
and delete their orders to avoid execution. But what seems to be a deletion is actually a modification,
as within the Xetra market model only a reduction of order volume does not affect price-time priority
while all other modifications are mapped to a deletion event and a subsequent submission event for the
‘new’ modified order. For 26.9% of the ATP orders deleted at the spread there is an ATP submission
event of a new order in the same instrument at exactly the same timestamp, with the same direction
(buy or sell) and exactly the same volume (Non-ATP: 23.2%). If the restrictions are relaxed (up to 1
second delay, +/-5% volume), there is a corresponding submission event for 40.2% of the ATP
deletions (Non-ATP: 33.4%) out of which 115,331 again improve the spread (Non-ATP: 16,822). This
indicates that ATP traders want their orders to be at the top of the book. Therefore, they emulate
pegging orders at their front end (an order type where the limit tracks the best bid or offer and moves
with the market) as this order type – contrary to other markets – is not provided by the Xetra back-end.
ATP
Non-ATP
Events Distribution Avg. Survival time (ms) Events Distribution Avg. Survival time (ms)
Execution 293,142
36.8%
17,927
184,009
64.9%
20,072
Deletion 503,650
63.2%
6,519
99,674
35.1%
11,731
Total

Table 7.

796,792

100.0%

10,716

283,410

100.0%

17,141

Survival time and termination reason for orders at the spread

To sum up the data analyzed concerning research question 3, the results indicate that ATP traders are
more aware of the current spread, as they more often reflect the current best bid or offer when limiting
their orders, and that their orders about three times more often narrow the current spread. Furthermore,
they control their orders relative to the current market situation and delete and reinsert their orders
based on changes in the current spread more extensively than Non-ATP traders do.

5

CONCLUSION

The detailed implementations of Algorithmic Trading systems are not published as these constitute
important intellectual property rights of investment firms and are a key component of their business
models both for proprietary trading and when providing algorithms to customers (regularly as a black
box). Therefore, only little is known about how Algorithmic Trading engines schedule their trading
and adapt to current market movements. Based on a unique dataset from a market operator that
includes a tag enabling to distinguish Algorithmic Trading engines and human traders, the order
submission behavior of both groups has been compared. An implication for theory is the result that the
submission and deletion behavior of Algorithmic Trading systems (statistically) significantly differs
from other market participants’. Evidence has been presented that they submit orders that are
noticeably smaller. Additionally they show the ability to monitor their orders and modify them to be at
the top of the book. Applying chi-square tests shows that Algorithmic Trading behavior is
fundamentally different to human trading concerning the use of order types, the positioning of limits in
case of executions and submissions as well as their modification/deletion behavior. These results let us
conclude that Algorithmic Trading systems capitalize on their advantageous ability to process high-

speed data feeds and react instantaneously to market movements by submitting corresponding orders
or modifying existing ones.
Future research based on the dataset will both investigate order submission strategies in auctions and
the contribution of Algorithmic Trading engines to overall market liquidity. This contributes not only
to the understanding of the algorithmic implementations but also has theoretical implications for
market design and market surveillance issues. Furthermore, the understanding of algorithmic behavior
has practical implications, as it enables to identify potential functional or technical bottlenecks.
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